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Buchin: Indian Law - Access to the Federal Courts - County of Oneida, New

INDIAN LAW-Access to the Federal Courts. County of Oneida, New
York v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York State, 105 S.Ct. 1245
(1985).
From time immemorial until shortly after the American Revolution,
the Oneida Indian Nation owned much of what is now central New York
State.1 In 1793, Congress passed the Trade and Intercourse Act which
provided that all persons trading with Indian tribes must first obtain a
license.2 Two years later, New
York State purchased 100,000 acres of land
3
from the Oneida Indians.
In 1970, the Oneida Indian Nation of New York, the Oneida Indian
Nation of Wisconsin and the Oneida of the Thames Band brought suit
against Madison and Oneida Counties of New York in United States
District Court. 4 The Oneidas claimed that the 1795 conveyance did not
comply with the 1793 Trade and Intercourse Act because no duly licensed
official was present at the transaction. They sought damages for the
wrongful use and occupation of land conveyed to New York State in 1795.1
The district court distaied the action. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Second CirCuit affirmed this decision, holding that the
action was basically in ejectment and was subject to dismissal for want
of federal jurisdiction. 6 In 1974, the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari and reversed and remanded the decision. The Supreme Court
held that the Oneidas' claim for possession did not preclude federal
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sections 1331 and 1362. 7 In its explanation,
the Court stated that, "[g]iven the nature and source of possessory rights
of Indian tribes to their aboriginal lands, particularly when confirmed by
treaty, it is plain that the complaint asserted a controversy arising under
the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States within the meaning of both Sections 1331 and 1362."1
On remand, the district court entered judgment for the Indians and
subsequently awarded damages. 9 The court of appeals affirmed the judg1. Oneida Indian Nation v. Oneida County, 464 F.2d 916 (2nd Cir. 1972), rev d, 414
U.S. 661 (1974). In 1788, New York entered into a treaty with the Indians which conveyed
most of this property to the state. The Oneida Nation retained 300,000 acres of this land.
2. Trade and Intercourse Act, ch. 19 §§ 1-15, 1 Stat. 329 (1793) (repealed 1796).
3. Oneida Indian Nation v. Oneida County, 434 F.Supp. 520, 530 (N.D.N.Y. 1974),
aff'd, 719 F.2d. 525 (2d Cir. 1983), modified, 105 S.Ct. 1245 (1985).
4. Oneida County v. Oneida Indian Nation, 105 S.Ct. 1245 (1985) [hereinafter OneidaII].
5. Id at 1249. The Oneidas sought damages for the years 1968 and 1969.
6. Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 464 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1972).
7. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982), district courts have original federal jurisdiction of.
"all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." According to 28 U.S.C. § 1362 (1982), district courts have original jurisdiction of all civil actions brought by an Indian tribe or band with a governing body duly recognized by the
Secretary of the Interior, wherein the matter in controversy arises under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States.
8. Oneida Indian Nation v. Oneida County, 414 U.S. 661, 667 (1974) [hereinafter
Oneida I].
9. Oneida Indian Nation v. Oneida County, 434 F.Supp. 527, 548 (N.D.N.Y. 1974),
aff'd, 719 F.2d 525 (2d Cir. 1983).
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ment on the issues of liability and indemnification but remanded for further proceedings on the damage award.' 0 The counties and New York State
petitioned for review." The Supreme Court again granted certiorari and
affirmed judgment for the Oneida Indians. 2 Prior to the Oneida decision,
courts did not uniformly recognize Indians' right to sue in federal court
to vindicate their tribal property rights. The Oneida Court held that the
Oneidas have a federal common law right of action for a violation of their
possessory rights. 3
BACKGROUND

The 1793 Trade and IntercourseAct
Congress passed the first Trade and Intercourse Act in 1790. The Act
specified that purchases of Indian land were illegal unless an authorized
federal government official was present. 4 The main purpose of the statute
was to prevent further acquisition of Indian land by white settlers. 5
When the 1790 Trade and Intercourse Act was due to expire, President George Washington urged Congress toenact further legislation to
check outrages committed by whites and rep als by Indians. 6 In 1793,
Congress passed another Trade and Intercourse Act to protect Indian
criminal, but not civil, sanctions for those
rights. The Act of 1793 provided
7
who violated its provisions.1
President Washington later urged further congressional action since
there were still hostilities between whites and Indians. Congress accordingly enacted the 1796 Trade and Intercourse Act.'9 The Act established
a geographic boundary between whites and Indians.' 9 The purpose of this
provision was to assure Indians that the government intended to uphold
treaties. This was the first time Indian country was designated in
statutory law.20 However, the 1796 Act did not establish remedies for violations of the government official requirement.
The fourth version of the Trade and Intercourse Act was passed
in 1802. The new Act did not alter the remedies for illegal convey10. Oneida Indian Nation v. Oneida County, 719 F.2d 525, 544 (2d Cir. 1983), modified,
105 S.Ct. 1245 (1985).

11. Id. at 527. On remand, the State of New York was brought into the proceeding
because the counties filed third party complaints. The counties sought to be indemnified
for any trespass damages that might be awarded against them.
12. Oneida II, 105 S.Ct. at 1262. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals'
decision that the federal courts could exercise ancillary jurisdiction over the counties' crossclaim against the State of New York for indemnification.
13. Id
14. Trade and Intercourse Act, ch. 33 §§ 1-7, 1 Stat. 137 (1790) (repealed 1793).
15. 1 F.F. PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER 90 (1984).
16. Id. at 91.
17. Trade and Intercourse Act, ch. 19 §§ 1-15, 1 Stat. 329 (1793) (repealed 1796).
18. Trade and Interocurse Act, ch. 30 §§ 1-22, 1 Stat. 469 (1796) (expired 1799).
19. Id
20. PRUCHA, supra note 15, at 93; Trade and Intercourse Act, ch. 46 §§ 1-21, 1 Stat.
743 (1799) (expired 1802).
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ances of tribal lands,2 ' but a subsequent amendment to the Act 2" provided that:
[I]n all trials about the right of property, in which Indians shall
be party on one side and white persons on the other, the burden
of proof shall rest upon the white person, in every case in which
the Indian shall make out a presumption of title2 in himself from
the fact of previous possession and ownership.
The 1822 Trade and Intercourse Act was the basic law governing Indian
relations
until it was replaced in 1834 by a new codification of Indian
24
policy.

Implying A Cause of Action

Case law from 1823 to the present demonstrates that federal common
law vindicates violations of tribal property rights. In Johnson v.
M'Intosh,'2 for example, the Court considered the power of Indians to give
and the ability of private individuals to receive an enforceable title. The
Court invalidated two private purchases of Indian land made in 1773 and
1775 because they were made without the Crown's consent.
The Court reaffirmed Johnson in Marsh v. Brooks.26 In Marsh, the
plaintiff sought to recover land granted to his ancestor under an 1839 patent. Recovery was barred because the land in question was within the
limits of a tract reserved by a treaty between the United States and the
Sac and Fox Indians.2 7 The Court in Marsh said that it "is not open to
question" that "an action of ejectment could be maintained [in the federal
courts] on an Indian right to occupancy and use.... ''28
Nearly a century later, Creek Nation v. United States29 established
that, as a general legal right, tribes may bring legal proceedings on their
own behalf. Tribes are not necessarily barred from bringing their own actions simply because the United States also has a right to sue. 0
In 1966, Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. Section 1362 which extended
federal jurisdiction to all civil actions brought by Indian tribes. In 1968,
Commanche Indians brought suit against Skelly Oil Co., which leased
Commanche tribal land, for impairing their royalties." The United States
Supreme Court stated that Indians could bring suit on their own behalf
to vindicate their rights, declaring:
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Trade and Intercourse Act, ch. 13 §§ 1-22, 2 Stat. 139 (1802) (amended 1822).
Trade and Intercourse Act, ch. 58 §§ 1-6, 3 Stat. 682 (1822).
Id.
Trade and Intercourse Act, ch. 161 §§ 1-30, 4 Stat. 682 (1822).
21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
49 U.S. (8 How.) 223 (1850).
Id. at 234.
Id at 232.
318 U.S. 629 (1943).
Id at 640.
Poafpybitty v. Skelly Oil Co., 390 U.S. 365 (1968).
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We agree that the federal restrictions preventing the Indian from
selling or leasing his allotted land without the consent of a governmental official do not prevent the Indian landowner, like other
property owners, from
maintaining suits appropriate to the pro32
tection of his rights.

Thus, as the Oneida Court observed, many decisions implicitly
recognize that Indians have a federal common law right to sue in federal
court to enforce their rights to land. Yet this common law right has been
denied in the past. For instance, in Jeager v. United States,3" the claims
court stated that "[in all the cases.., in which the interest of an Indian
tribe has been the subject of litigation the proceeding has been under
special statute conferring the right upon the claimant to bring suit."3 5 In

Oneida, the Court addressed the issue of whether Indians may bring a
common law suit in federal court to enforce their possessory rights in land.
THE PRINCIPAL CASE

New York State, Madison County and Oneida County first argued that
the Oneida Indians had no right of action for the violation of the 1793

Trade and Intercourse Act.3 6 In rebutting this assertion, the Court ex-

amined the history of the federal common law in relation to Indian tribes.
Initially, the Court noted that the United States Constitution grants
37
the federal government sole authority to supervise relations with Indians.
Because the federal government has sole authority, it has been recognized
that "federal law, treaties, and statutes protected Indian occupancy and
' '3
that its termination was exclusively the province of federal law.
However, the Court has observed that "a tribal right of occupancy, to
be protected, need not be based upon a treaty, statute, or other formal
government action. '39 The Court decided that federal common law applied
in the Oneida case, saying:
There being no federal statute making the statutory or decisional
law of the State of New York applicable to the reservations, the
controlling law remained federal law; and, absent federal statutory
guidance, the governing rule of decision would be fashioned by
the federal court in the mode of the common law.40
The state and counties next argued that the Trade and Intercourse
Acts preempted any common law cause of action.4 1 The court found this
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 372.
Oneida II, 105 S.Ct. at 1252.
27 Cl. Ct. 278 (1892).
Id. at 285.
Oneida I, 105 S.Ct. at 1251.
Id.
Oneida 1, 414 U.S. at 670.
United States v. Santa Fe Pacific R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 343 (1941).
Oneida I, 414 U.S. at 674.
Oneida II, 105 S.Ct. at 1252.
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argument "unpersuasive." 41 Citing its decision in Milwaukee v. Illinois,3
the Court first stated that utilizing federal common law is appropriate
when Congress has not "spoken to a particular issue. "4 The Court pointed
out that the 1793 Trade and Intercourse Act did not provide remedies
for unlawful conveyances of Indian land. Therefore, federal common law
applied.45
The Court then decided that borrowing New York's statute of limitations would be inconsistent with underlying federal policy. 46 The New York
statute of limitations applies only to transactions occurring after
September 13, 1952. 47 The Court noted that, since the transaction in the
instant case 48 occurred prior to this date, the New York statute is
inapplicable.
28 U.S.C. Section 241549 supports the Court's position that state
statutes of limitations should not apply to Indian land claims. 0 Section
2415 also shows that no federal statute of limitations applies. Section 2415
specifies the time limit within which the United States, on behalf of Indian tribes, must commence suit for contract and tort claims. The statute
stipulates that a cause of action occurring prior to the date of enactment
accrued on that date. Congress later extended the time within which the
United States could bring actions on behalf of Indian tribes. The Court
reviewed the legislative history and concluded that Congress had no intention of applying Section 2415 to suits brought by Indian tribes.
Therefore, the Oneidas' right to sue was not subject to any federal or state
statute of limitations.5
In contrast to the original statute, the 1982 amendment to 28 U.S.C.
Section 2415 imposes a period of limitations on certain tort and contract
claims brought by individual Indians and Indian tribes. Section 5(c) of
the 1982 amendment requires the Secretary of the Interior to publish a
notice in the Federal Register identifying all claims accruing to any group
of Indians on or before July 18, 1966. All claims listed are barred unless
a complaint is filed within one year after the date of publication.52 The
Court interpreted 28 U.S.C. Section 2415 as amended in 1982 to mean
that "so long as a listed claim is neither acted upon nor formally rejected
by the Secretary, it remains live."53 The Court concluded that 28 U.S.C.
Section 2415, as amended in 1982, thus "presumes the existence of an Indian right of action not otherwise subject to any statute of limitations. "54
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 1253.
451 U.S. 304 (1981).
Oneida II, 105 S.Ct. at 1253.
Id. at 1254.
Id. at 1255.
25 U.S.C. § 233 (1982).
Oneida II, 105 S.Ct. at 1255.
28 U.S.C. § 2415 (1982).
Oneida II, 105 S.Ct. at 1256.
Id.
28 U.S.C. § 2415 (1966) (amended 1982).
Oneida II, 105 S.Ct. at 1256.
Id.
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The state and counties argued that the 1796 Trade and Intercourse
Act repealed the 1793 Trade and Intercourse Act. The Court rejected this
contention, concluding that the 1793 and 1796 Trade and Intercourse Acts
simply codified the principle that the federal government's consent was
necessary to extinguish aboriginal title. 55 Finding no meritorious defense,
the Oneida Court held that Indians have a federal common law right of
action to enforce their possessory rights in land.
ANALYSIS

While no statute expressly provides the Oneidas with a cause of action, the United States Constitution suggests that actions involving tribal
property rights should be settled in the federal courts. Article 1, section
8, clause 3, gives Congress power to "regulate Commerce, with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes." Inferring that this cause of action should be settled in federal court is
appropriate.
Case law also establishes that the federal court is the proper forum
for Indian land claims. In Johnson v. M'Intosh,5 6 the Court said:
The power now possessed by the government of the United
States to grant lands, resided, while we were colonies, in the Crown
or its grantees. The validity of the titles given by either has never
been questioned in our courts. It has been exercised uniformly over
territory in possession of the Indians. The existence of this power
must negative the existence of any right which may conflict with
and control it."
While the parties in Johnson were non-Indians, the decision indicates that
suits involving Indian land rights were litigated in the federal courts early in this country's history.
The 1793 Trade and Intercourse Act did not provide a remedy for
violations of the requirement that a government official supervise conveyances of Indian land. 58 Therefore, the question is whether or not a
private right of action can be implied from the 1793 Trade and Intercourse
Act.
In Cort v. Ash,59 the Supreme Court set forth criteria for determining
when private rights of action may be implied from federal statutes. The
first factor is whether or not the the plaintiff is "one of the class for whose
especial benefit the statute was enacted. 60 This question concerns "not
simply who would benefit from the Act, but whether Congress intended
to confer federal rights upon those beneficiaries.' '61 Indians are the intend55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id at 1257.
21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 570 (1823).
Id. at 579.
See supra text accompanying note 17.
422 U.S. 66 (1975).
Id. at 78 (emphasis in original).
California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 295 (1981).
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ed beneficiaries of the 1793 Trade and Intercourse Act. The Act's main
function was to regulate trade with Indians. The legislative history also
1793 Trade and Intercourse Act was for the special
suggests that the 62
benefit of Indians.
The second factor in determining whether remedies may be implied
from a statute is whether there is "any indication of legislative intent,
explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one." 6 3 Section 8 of the 1793 Trade and Intercourse Act did not state that a tribe
could maintain a private right of action. 4 This may imply that Congress
did not intend to confer a private right of action. In Land v. Santa Rosa,65
however, the Court allowed Pueblo Indians to pursue an action to enjoin
the Secretary of Interior and the Commissioner of the General Land Office from disposing of land to which the Indians claimed title, even though
the applicable federal statute did not specify that Indians could bring suit.
Thus, legislation does not have to state explicitly that Congress granted
a right of action. The Court properly allowed the Oneida Indians to litigate
this matter in federal court.
The third question in the Cort analysis is whether implying a remedy
is "consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative
67
scheme... "66 Guidelines set forth in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham
are instructive in determining when it is appropriate to supplement federal
statutory remedies. Courts may fill in statutory gaps left by Congress's
silence.6 8 The Trade and Intercourse Acts specified that Indian titles could
be extinguished only with the consent of the United States. 69 The purpose of the Acts was to protect Indians from alienation of tribal lands.
Given this purpose, it is reasonable to imply a remedy even in the face
of congressional silence.
The final question set out by Cort is whether the cause of action is
"traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of
the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action
based solely on federal law." 0 The United States Constitution and case
law support the contention that state law traditionally has not been utilized to resolve violations of Indian property rights. Since Indian property rights are not an area of state concern, federal court7 is the proper
forum in which to vindicate the violation of these rights. 1
The Oneidas meet each element of the test outlined in Cort. Therefore,
the Oneida Court correctly held that a private right of action could be
implied from the 1793 Trade and Intercourse Act.
62. See supra text accompanying note 17.
63. Cort, 422 U.S. at 78.
64. Brief for the State of New York at 23, Oneida Indian Nation v. Oneida County,
105 S.Ct. 1245 (1985).
65. 249 U.S. 110 (1919).
66. Cort, 422 U.S. at 78.
67. 436 U.S. 618 (1978).
68. Id. at 625.
69. See supra text accompanying notes 14-24.
70. Cort, 422 U.S. at 78.
71. See supra text accompanying notes 25, 38.
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The second aspect of the Court's holding, that the New York State
statute of limitations did not apply to the Oneidas' suit, was also correct.
This is because the application of the state statute would entirely bar the
Oneidas' suit and deny the Indians access to any court.
The Oneida Court glossed over New York's interest in enforcing its
statute of limitations and preventing the litigation of stale claims. The
Oneidas did wait 175 years to bring an action for their claim. Indians,
however, probably had very little opportunity to vindicate their rights
in federal court in 1795.
The frequency of offenses committed against Indians by frontier
whites, among which outright murder was commonplace, was
shocking. It was often a question of who was more aggressive,
more hostile, more savage-the Indian or the white man. The
murders and other aggressions of whites against Indians provided one of the great sources of friction between the two races. Lack
of enforcement made a mockery of the statutes. The typical frontier community could not be brought to convict a man who injured
or murderd an Indian, and confusion as to the status of the federal
courts in the territories delayed effective action."
Furthermore, the federal interests involved outweigh the state's interests. The federal courts have had much experience in litigating claims
of this nature. Thus they can be presumed to have an expertise in dealing
with them. Since similar suits might be brought by other Indian tribes,
the federal government has a strong interest in seeing that there is uniformity in these types of decisions.
In Heckman v. United States,73 the government sought to cancel a
conveyance of land executed by Cherokee Indians. Government attorneys
argued that the conveyance violated restrictions upon the power of alienation. The Court stated that the welfare of the Indians was "distinctly"
an interest of the federal government. 4 Since only the federal government
can extinguish title to Indian land, the federal government had a distinct
interest in litigating the Oneida suit in federal court.
This interest is predicated on the 1793 Trade and Intercourse Act.
New York argued that Congress repealed the 1793 Act by enacting the
1796 Trade and Intercourse Act.75 If this were true, then the Oneidas' common law right of action is vitiated. However, New York's argument is
6
spurious. Bear Lake Irrigation Co. v. Garland1
established that legislation does not abate when subsequent acts on the same subject are "similar
and almost identical."" Legislation is considered "repealed" only when
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

1 F.F. PRUCHA, supra note 15, at 105.
224 U.S. 413 (1912).
Id. at 437.
Oneida II, 105 S.Ct. at 1257.
164 U.S. 1 (1869).
Id. at 11.
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by "overtly and explicitly abrogating
change in the legal system is effected
7' 8
provisions of prior statute law."
The Trade and Intercourse Acts of 1790 to 1834 all required the
presence of a government official to convey Indian land. 9 Even though
the 1796 Trade and Intercourse Act replaced the 1793 Trade and Intercourse Act, the provision forbidding transfer of Indian land without the
government's consent remained in effect. The 1796 Trade and Intercourse
Act did not repeal the 1793 version and should therefore be construed
as a continuation of the 1793 Trade and Intercourse Act. Since common
law remedies did not abate, they were properly implied by the Oneida
Court.
CONCLUSION

Early in its history, the United States established its interest in protecting Indian land rights. The Oneida Court reaffirms this principle by
holding that the Oneida Indians have a common law right of action for
the violation of the 1793 Trade and Intercourse Act. Because land claims
of this nature may arise in the future, the federal courts do have a strong
interest in promoting uniform decisions. Federal courts have traditionally litigated Indian land claims and are thus more expert in this type of
litigation. Finally, Indian tribes should not be denied their day in court.
This is only accomplished by allowing the Indians access to the federal
court system.
JOANNE BUCHIN

78. 1A C.D. SANDS, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 314 (rev. 4th ed. 1985).
79. See supra text accompanying notes 14-24.
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